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Good Corporate Governance Policies and
Disclosure Mechanisms in Startup
Companies
Yahel Kaplan1
Abstract
In the past decades, particularly following the collapse of huge
corporation such as WorldCom and Enron due to dubious or
illegal financial management, countries began gradually
increasing the oversight of publicly traded companies with few
jurisdictions conjuring recommended corporate governance
                 
ability to loot their companies, and        
                 
While RCGC was intended namely for public company, several
organizations called for the adoption of RCGC in startup
companies. Startup companies suffer from various failures which
the classic corporate laws are not equipped to address significant
conflicts of interest throughout their financing process, interested
                 
composition. Among the proposed solutions for such failures, as
regulated in recent years for public companies, is the
implementation of such RCGC. This article presents the
fundamental issues in startups which call for adoption of RCGC:
the principal-agent problem, numerous conflicts of interest and
misalignment of interest between the founders and the investors
               
management and future. This article reviews the possible
application of RCGC doctrines to startups; with respect to
empirical and economical researchers that examine the benefit of
RCGC on the value of startups and reducing the cost of raising
capital, and researches and position papers which call for the
1

LL.M. (Columbia University, New York), LL.B., B.A. (Interdisciplinary Center
Herzliya, Israel).
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adoption of RCGC in startup companies. This article also
analyzes the clashes between the startups need for flexibility with
the benefits and importance of adoption of RCGC. Lastly, the
article presents various RCGC models, which have not yet been
introduces in academic papers, which can be adopted in startups,
inter alia, increasing the number of outside directors (both as a
casting vote in even of founders-investors dead-locks as well as
an impartial mentor for the founders), adopting procedures for
board meetings and increasing their frequency, and amending the
controlling and management rights in the company as a factor of
the expected return on investment.
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1.
WHAT ARE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND
WHY SHOULD THEY BE INTRODUCED IN PRIVATE COMPANIES
Corporate governance, in its purest form, is a set of principles and
conditions aimed at ensuring the adequate and appropriate allocation of
the risks and returns from company activities between its various
stakeholders, including stockholders, managers, creditor, employees and
recently, also the community.2 Corporate governance principles are, inter
            
      

2

J. ROBERT BROWN JR. & LISA L. CASEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: CASES
MATERIALS 2 (2012).
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composition and roles, transparency requirements to overcome
information asymmetry between shareholders, and succession planning.3
Similarly, to the discussion in public companies, the design of
corporate governance principles in private companies is intended to
prevent the relapse of past occurrences of abuse of shareholders capital by
unchecked management, as was the case in Enron and WorldCom and to
create an effective communication chancel between shareholders and
management.4
Following these premises, the OECD laid out a proposed structure of
      reassure shareholders and
other stakeholders that their rights are protected and make it possible for
corporations to decrease the cost of capital and to facilitate its access to
the capital market5 However, and unlike in public companies, in private,
non-listed companies, the absence of market for corporate control (by, for
example, hostile take-overs), reduces the ability to control for
underperforming management.6
The recent years have seen a shift of capital raising from the public to
the private section. While concepts of corporate governance and good
governance codes in public companies have been promulgated around the
world for over three decades7, the notion of good governance in non-listed
companies have been getting traction in the recent year. In this respect,
OECD dedicated a summit and a comprehensive analysis of the
implementation of corporate governance codes to non-listed companies,
in particular in markets with less developed equity market.8
Private companies, and particularly startups, have been financing their
operations through a venture financing channel for the past several
decades, which occurs under the assumption that venture capital should be
raised from efficient capital market that price the risk accordingly.9
However, unlike with public companies, which are subject to various
regulatory corporate governance obligations, private companies
3

Id. at 8-13.
OECD, G20/OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (OECD Publishing,
2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264236882-en.
5
See id. at 10 (distinguishing that this structure is based on a soft power approach of
comply or explain model, rather than a mandatory regulation).
6
Id. at 28.
7
See Collins G. Ntim, Defining Corporate Governance: Shareholder Versus
Stakeholder Models, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON BUSINESS SCHOOL, UK, Jan. 4, 2018,
at 1.
8
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD),
Corporate Governance of Non-Listed Companies in Emerging Markets,
https://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/37190767.pdf
(last
visited Apr. 10, 2021).
9
Ntim, supra note 7, at 5.
4
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governance is subject to a loose (or even non-existent) oversight by
regulators or the financial market. This is most amply reflected by the fact
that startups governance is arguably not priced in the process of venture
financing.10
Lastly, it should be noted that implementation of good corporate
governance guidelines have been found to reduce the cost of capital in
bond-companies11 (however, additional research is required to determine
if these results would bear similar effect on private companies and
startups).

2.

LESSONS FROM ENRON  WHAT HAPPENS WITHOUT GOOD
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPALS

On December 2001 Enron, which was considered for many years as
one of the most innovative companies in the U.S. with reported profits of
$1 Billion12 and among the largest corporations in the U.S., declared
bankruptcy.13   apse were considered by
many as destructive corporate governance practices that causes a steep
decline in the trust of investors in the capital markets. This set in a motion
various corporate governance reforms including the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
  14
10

The question of appropriate financing of corporate governance has been widely
debated; Bebchuk et. al found in the early 2010s that while investors were (positively)
surprised by introduction of corporate provisions until 2001, thereafter there was no
indication that introducing such provisions had any bearing on the stock price (Bebchuk,
L.A., Cohen, A. and Wang, C.C., 2013. Learning and the disappearing association between
governance and returns. Journal of financial economics, 108(2). Moreover, Larcker and
Tayan argued that the sheer number of variables on the stock price of public capital renders
the mission to isolate the effect of corporate governance on the stock price impossible
(Larcker, D.F. and Tayan, B., 2019. Loosey-Goosey Governance: Four Misunderstood
Terms in Corporate Governance. Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford
University).
11
Feifei Zhu, Cost of Capital and Corporate Governance: International
Evidence, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN, MILWAUKEE, August 2009, at 1,
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Feifei-Zhu7/publication/228775167_Cost_of_Capital_and_Corporate_Governance_International_E
vidence/links/58cc4ad4a6fdcc5cccb98bec/Cost-of-Capital-and-Corporate-GovernanceInternational-Evidence.pdf.
12
Peter Munzig, Enron and the Cconomics of Corporate Governance, DEP. OF
ECONOMICS
STANFORD
UNIVERSITY,
June
2003,
at
3,
20,
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.198.1043&rep=rep1&type=pd
f.
13
Stuart Gillan & John D. Martin, Corporate Governance Post-Enron: Effective
Reforms, or Closing the Stable Door?, 13(5) JOURNAL OF CORPORATE FINANCE 929, 932
(Feb. 2007).
14
Id. at 932.
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The Use oSpecial Purpose Entities in  Financial
Statements
Enron implemented various questionable practices that created a
smokescreen to the financial market. Amongst such practices was the use
of off- ( $!" ##") SPE). While the U.S.
accounting regulations at the time did not require companies to disclose or
consolidate their SPEs in their financial statements, many scholars argue
that companies could have, and arguably should have, provided indication
of such, possibly by means of a detailed footnote or management
discussion and analysis disclosure.15 The reason that omission of SPEs
disclosure is detrimental for investors is the fact that the use of SPEs does
not affect the credit rating of the parent company, which creates an
!#!""!!"*%$. Additionally, this practice limits
the ability of shareholders and the financial market to conduct the level of
monitoring that is customarily provided by public market institutions.16
It has been a!$## !*"!#"$!%"""'
prevent, the managements prolific use of SMEs. This is, predominantly,
$###*"$" "#-existing marketprovided vehicles, which should have at least raised concerns, and at best,
led to an overall restriction of such practices by the Board.17
!$'"!#!"$# !*"!#"$#
disclosure of SPEs, a provision in SOX was introduced to require that all
(#!-balance s##!"#")&%#""
#'*"$ $!#!'!!#"18

Compensation
  !*"
  ! # ' !%
compensation of more than $140 million, most of which was reflected in
the value of his exercised options.19 It is imperative to note that this rate of
compensation was more than ten times greater than that of an average CEO
of a publicly traded company in that year.20 On the one hand, many
economists argue that stock option grants to the C-level employees and
directors are beneficial in that it aligns the interests of shareholders and
management. However, such option grant could incentivize management
15

Jeffrey N. Gordon, Governance Failures of the Enron Board and the New Information
Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, March 2003, at 1, 7-8,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=391363.
16
Id. at 8.
17
See id. at 4.
18
Munzig, supra note 12, at 48.
19
Id. at 30.
20
Id.
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to manipulate financial statements by self-dealing. This may occur by
managers taking larger risks in order to increase the stock price of the
company and as a result increase the value of their options.21 This concern
   !       

  22 The problem with this practice is that it unequally
allocates the risk between the management and shareholders. The result of
this would be that while the management is expected to benefit from the
upside of the increased risk while any fallouts would mainly affect the
shareholders.23
It    !      
the management compensation, chiefly by knowingly failing to monitor
             !  
plan 24 including the stock-based compensation structure.25
It should be, therefore, of little surprise that the SOX imposes
significant limitation on board discretion when it comes to      
         26 Additionally, SOX created a
mandatory corrective disclosure whenever the board is unable to
    !      27

Financial Reporting Restatements
During mid-2001, Enron started conducting a series of earning
restatement for the period spanning from 1997-2001, which led to a
        !         28 Soon
thereafter, on December 2001, Enron filed for bankruptcy.29 Some
mechanisms placed to prevent recurrence of such were enshrined under
SOX which compels the CEO and CFO to reimburse the company for any
compensation that resulted in the company filing financial noncompliance
restatement.30

21

Id. at 31.
Id.
23
See id.
24
Dennis M. Ray, Corporate Boards and Corporate Democracy, 20 JOURNAL OF
CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP
93,
95
(2005), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.530.6809&rep=rep1&t
ype=pdf.
25
Gordon, supra note 15, at 4.
26
Id.
27
Id. (arguing that such overwhelming elimination of the board!s discretion could be
counter-productive).
28
Munzing, supra note 12, at 20-21.
29
Id. at 21.
30
Id. at 48.
22
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The Result of Insufficient Board Oversight
The lack of Board independence gets to the core oversight
function of a board of directors. It is imperative that a
board be capable of looking objectively at the
management and outside professional advisors of a firm,
  s not capable in this respect. This
layer of corporate governance, that is the board oversight
function, should act as a final mechanism to protect
investors when other governance institutions have broken
down. It should serve to help avoid conflicts of interest,
ensure auditing independence and accurate financial
reporting, oversee compensation practices, as well as
many other breakdowns that occurred within Enron. This
last layer, however, failed to serve its purpose and was
compromised largely because of the relationships
between Enron, management, and the directors
themselves.31

3.

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE UNDER EXISTING LEGAL REGIME

a.

Disclosures

Disclosure is, in essence, a mechanism by which companies share
information on their financials, operations, and developments with their
shareholders.32 In particular, disclosure enables shareholders and board
members to make informed decisions.33 The catastrophes of recent history,
         
informed co Board often failed to give enough consideration
when approving costly or risky decisions and transactions, even with
insufficient information or grasp of the types of transactions Enron was
engaging in.34          monitor the
               
            an increased risk
to existing and prospect investors.35
To date, periodic reports remain a critical source of information for
shareholders of public companies, as varying regulation enable companies
31
32
33
34
35



Id. at 46.
Brown & Casey, supra note 2, at 509.
Id.
See Munzing, supra note 12, at 6-7.
Gordon, supra note 15, at 4.
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to interact with the public market in less formal ways, commonly not
subject to SEC regulation, and enables companies to engage in selective
disclosure to specific shareholders or investors.36
For public companies, there are various regulatory disclosure
obligations; for example, companies with more than 500 shareholders of
record and assets in the access of $10M must file quarterly reports to their
respective shareholders.37 In private companies, however, the disclosure
obligations are far scarcer, depending heavily on the type of exempted
offering38 and are otherwise namely contractual-dependent. Moreover, the
only information available to the pubic are the Regulation D exempt
offerings.39 The most common contractual mechanism of disclosure for
venture-        "   
  "             
agreement which sets forth, inter alia, the right of major investors to access
certain information of private companies, and often also includes the right
to appoint a board observer, and commonly requires provisions of
quarterly and annual financial statements.40 However, while this is a rather
powerful contractual tool, it is namely reserved for major investors, and
other stockholders have no access to such information and observance
rights.41
                 
company voluntarily disclose any financial reports, regardless of firm
 !42           
    !43 On the other hand, some calls have been made to
regulate the disclosure obligations in private companies once they reach a
certain market capitalization (namely, above $1 Billion in valuation).44
The significance of this proposal is founded in the fact that unicorns share
similar traits to those of public companies, both in size and effect on the
economy and communities. For example, Uber, prior to its IPO earlier this
36

Brown & Casey, supra note 2, at 549 ( Whenever an issuer, or any person acting on
its behalf, discloses any material nonpublic information regarding that issuer or its
securities to any person described in paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the issuer shall make
public disclosure of that information as provided in § 243.101(e) . . . !).
37
Id.
38
Jennifer S. Fan, Regulating Unicorns: Disclosure and the New Private Economy, 57
B.C. L. REV. 583, 591 (2016) (noting that many venture financings rely on Regulation D
safe harbors! which indicate the type of disclosure required by the company to the
investors).
39
Id. at 598.
40
Id. at 596-597.
41
Id.
42
Michael Minnis & Nemit Shroff, Why Regulate Private Firm Disclosure and
Auditing?, 47(5) ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH 473, 474 (2017).
43
Id.
44
Fan, supra note 38, at 609.



40

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:31

year, reportedly had tens of thousands drivers across the globe and grosses
billions of dollars.45 Therefore, in light of the recent trend toward favoring
stakeholder approach of corporate purpose, a company with such a
significant impact on the economy and communities, which operation
often requires changes in infrastructure which cannot be accounted for
sans data about the company and its operation, should be adequately
monitored by the public and regulators. This is in line with the basis of the
stakeholder approach, which stipulates that since local communities
supply the companies with local infrastructure and employees, they
require in return an improvement in their quality of life46 (which can only
be ensured and regulated with sufficient information and disclosures from
the companies).

(1) Benefit of disclosure regime
Behavior Correction
Disclosure serves as an effective corporate governance mechanism as
it creates an incentive for improved governance in order to avoid
disgraceful disclosure by being required to correct matters subject to
disclosure.47
The mandatory disclosure regime is particularly important for several
additional reasons:
 Misalignment of interest  misalignment of interest between
management and shareholders have been found to generate
ineffective financial and growth results for startups, both with
respect to growth as well as returns for stockholders48, whereas
the misalignment might be eliminated by gapping the information
asymmetry through mandatory disclosure.
 Non-diversifiable Investment  an effective governance system
(inter alia, through mechanism of disclosure) have been found to
increase shareholders likelihood to invest even though they might
face a reduced ability to diversify their investment or increase
their likelihood to invest in poor-performing companies.49
45

Id. at 599-600.
Ntim, supra note 7, at 9.
47
Brown & Casey, supra note 2, at 509.
48
Michael Klausner & Stephen Venuto, Liquidation Rights and Incentive Misalignment
in Start-up Financing, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1399, 1399 (2013).
49
Allen Ferrell, The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around
the World, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 81, 107 (2007). It should also be noted that
diversification is a crucial instrument for an investor which is often associated with an
increased cost of capital. Angela Gore, Does Mandatory Disclosure Reduce the Cost of
Capital? Evidence from Bonds, LUNDQUIST COLLEGE OF BUSINESS, UNIVERSITY OF OREGON
46
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Reduction in transaction costs  Many economists found that a
regime of mandatory disclosures of information by companies not
only        
   50, lowering the cost of credit51 and
increase its liquidity.52
Reduction in race-to-capital competition  As indicated by the
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Jay
 Increased disclosure and other burdens may render
alternatives for raising capital, such as the private markets,
increasingly attractive.53 Therefore, among the benefits of
disclosure in small companies is the reduction in competition with
large public companies over capital;54 the new access of small
        
information, acts as an intermediary of information sharing and
increases the attractiveness of investing in the small company.
This adds an additional layer of incentive to private companies to
disclose information, as credit rating agencies tend to increase the
credit rating of companies with organized disclosure
mechanism.55         ncial status
and operation can be a positive indicator of its growth potential
                
investors of its transparency and thus reduce the risk (and cost) of
venture financing (by reducing the required due diligence and
implementation of safeguards).56
Disclosure credibility  one of the suggestions made in connection
with the creation of a mandatory disclosure regime is to require
disclosure to an impartial third party. That is since a disclosure to
a third party, rather to an investor, increases the credibility of the
disclosure and would potentially reduce transaction costs.57Also,
especially for micro-companies wishing to opt in to such

1, 5 (July 2012). This further supports the significance of disclosure regime even compared
to an investors right to demand a higher return.
50
Benito Arruñada, Mandatory Accounting Disclosure by Small Private Companies, 32
EUR. J. LAW ECON. 377, 379 (2010).
51
Id. at 380.
52
Gore, supra note 49 at 1.
53
Macfarland, Matt, SEC chairman: Disclosure requirements encourage companies to
stay private, The SNL Insurance Daily; Charlottesville (July 13, 2017).
54
Arruñada, supra note 50, at 398.
55
Id. at 401.
56
Zhu, supra note 11 at 23. On the other hand, startups should be cautious on disclosure
since it could be viewed as desperate to receive influx of cash which would increase the
cost of capital.
57
Arruñada, supra note 50, at 389.
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mandatory-disclosure regime, an external mandatory rule can save
them a cost in terms of evaluating the value of disclosure in an
optional-         
be perfectly rational in evaluating costs and benefits but may be
pressured by maladapted social norms to behave in accordance
with the norm. This may happen, for instance, if the norm imposes
additional costs (e.g., a reputational loss) on those who do not
58
While mandatory disclosure does not necessarily benefit small
companies as it does to public ones, there is a requirement, though less
comprehensive, of information disclosure by small private companies in
connection with investments.59

(2) Objection to disclosure regime
Irrespective of the benefits mentioned above, the main discouraging
factor is the costs associated with disclosure, particularly for small
              
tax position which could require retaining expensive advisors.
Additionally, small companies are often incapable of correctly estimating
the costs and benefits of disclosure, particularly in companies with
separation of ownership and control.60 Moreover, private and public
companies alike may suffer several harms that disincentivize disclosure,
amongst them, competitive disadvantage and loss of personal privacy.61
This concern is substantiated by several researchers that have found that
           
       62
In this respect, a more comprehensive disclosure regime or an
expansion of statutory disclosure exemptions may limit the costs
associated with disclosure since all non-disclosing companies would be
required to find an alternative means to provide information to investors
58

Id. at 404.
Id. at 396.
60
Id. at 404.
61
Id.
62
Dee Gill, Should private companies be required to report their financials?, CHICAGO
BOOTH
REVIEW
(June
22,
2017),
https://review.chicagobooth.edu/accounting/2017/article/should-private-companies-berequired-report-their-financials. In this regard, it should be indicated that in a review
conducted by the Wall Street Journal, many noted to refrain from divulging financial
information to prevents it from falling into rival hands which enables companies
freedom to invest for the long term. See Rolfe Winkler, Startup Employees Invoke
Obscure Law to Open Up Books, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL (May 24, 2016),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/startup-employees-invoke-obscure-law-to-open-up-books1464082202.
59
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(and thus disincentivized from operating outside the disclosure regime).63
In addition to direct costs, several researchers indicated the existence of
indirect costs, such as the cost of monitoring, compiling, and
disseminating the financial information.64 The information intermediaries
(such as the credit rating agencies) tend to be relevant with respect to small
companies, since some provide incomplete data to the intermediary and
other completely fail to cooperate, resulting in incomplete data of the
intermediary.65 Small companies often face significant competition (which
is more detrimental to their survival than to listed and established firms).
Therefore, since disclosure exposes small companies to other companies
exploiting their data, such companies might be disincentivized to
disclose.66 However, several researchers found that in some cases the
benefits from the ability to learn about the financial information of
                    
information.67
Disclosure decision by company managers can be one that would not
maximize the value of the firm for shareholders, which may occur due to
misalignment of management and ownership.68 However, commonly
small firms have little separation of ownership and management since the
managers area usually also the shareholders.

b.

Board of Directors
(1) Structure

The current version of the Delaware General Corporation Code
contains virtually no qualification prerequisites for board members, and
          
shall apply.69 This approach has been widely criticized, inter alias, by
Ralph Nadar who contended that board members are often unaware of
management illicit behavior, such as discrimination, workplace hazard,
and the likes.70

63

Arruñada, supra note 50, at 382.
Gore, supra note 49, at 3.
65
Arruñada, supra note 50, at 404.
66
Id.; Gore, supra note 49, at 56.
67
See Gill, supra note 62.
68
Arruñada, supra note 50, at 29.
69
ZABIHOLLAH REZAEE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE POST-SARBANES-OXLEY,
REGULATIONS, REQUIREMENTS, AND INTEGRATED PROCESSES 217218 (2007).
70
See RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN, AND JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT
CORPORATION 1732 (1977) (citing which calls to question, for example, the requirement
for appointment of independent directors.).
64
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The importance of a strong monitoring board is essential, and
particularly important in public companies in light of the Enron scandal.
                    
                 
fiduciary duties and responsibility to shareholders.71
In private companies, the composition of the board of directors of a
startup changes rapidly during the nascent stages of the company, when
        72 However,
following the a financing round in the startup, member(s) of the investor(s)
                      
               
ongoing management.73
It has been widely established that there is a commonplace disparity
in of interest and mindset between the founder-manager, investors, and
external board members. This is, in part, due to the fact management
directors, particularly in private companies (and even more so in startups),
are not compensated for their position in the board, unlike investordirectors and external directors which often receive compensation in a
form of stock options, commonly ranging between 0.5%-1% of the
    74 Moreover, the founder-manager director
show to have more psychological attachment and passion to the
company75, and investor-director are more focused on growth and have
fiduciary duty to their own investors to advance successful exit
strategies76, while public company directors focus on long-term strategic
planning and monitoring.77 Therefore, private company board is much
more prone to conflicts of interest and goal determination than in public
companies.78

(2) Role and purpose in corporate governance.
The role of the board of directors in private companies vary rapidly
between managerial approaches and scholars. At its core, the board of
71

Brown and Casey, supra note 2, at 96.
JONAS GABRIELSSON, HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 113 (2017).
73
Id.
74
Suren Dutia, Primer for Building an Effective Board for Growing Startup Companies,
1,
7
(2014),
https://www.kauffman.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/12/primer_for_building_an_effective_board.pdf.
75
Gabrielsson, supra note 72, at 114.
76
Renée B. Adams, Benjamin E. Hermalin, and Michael S. Weisbach, THE ROLE OF
BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND
SURVEY 2930 (2009).
77
Brown & Casey, supra note 2, at 96.
78
Gabrielsson, supra note 72, at 114.
72
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directors is responsible for laying a framework of corporate objectives,
  $  firing, and compensation
of senior management and interaction with shareholders.79 Moreover, the
board of directors is the ultimate supervisory body of the company and the
ultimate responsibility for good corporate governance of the company.80
Per the Del     "    
of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or
under the direction of the board of directors, except as otherwise be
provided in this chapter or in its certification of incor #81 The
significance of this provisions is based on the fact that it is optional and
    !     !$   
Professor Stephan Bainbridge stipulates, the provision would easily be
applied close corporations82, as is the case of startup companies.
For example, one method for eliminating the majority tyranny is to
require that major decision in the company will require the approval of all
shareholders (or the majority of each type of shares, if the company issued
preferred stock, or several series thereof), in order to prevent controlling
shareholders that commonly also control the board to take value-extraction
resolution against the interest of the minority shareholders.83
Brown and Casey argue that the board of directors is responsible for
management of the business and affairs of the corporation as well as to
delegate managerial duties to person on which the board is tasked with
monitoring.84     " !#
 $           "     
      #85 Another criticism
        "  !     #86 This
approach does not come without opposition; Adams et. al, referring to
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John D. Sullivan, Andrew Wilson, and Anna Nadgrodkiewicz, The Role of Corporate
Governance
in
Fighting
Corruption,
at
11
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ru/Documents/finance/role_corporate_g
overnance_sullivan_eng.pdf.
80
Rezaee, supra note 69, at 87.
81
Del. Code Ann., Tit. 8, § 141(a).
82
Stephen Bainbridge, DGCL Section 141(a) versus Precommitment Strategies, (Dec.
30, 2005) https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2005/12/dgclsection-141a-versus-precommitment-strategies.html.
83
However, there$s a caveat to this approach in a form of transaction proposed by a
controlling shareholding which conditions its approval of the transaction upon the approval
of the majority of the minority shareholders. See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev.785,785 (2003).
84
Brown & Casey, supra note 2.
85
Adams, supra note 76, at 64.
86
Brown & Casey, supra note 2, at 96.
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be provide discipline to the management.87
Moreover, even accepting the premise that contemporary board is able
to and expected to oversee and discipline the management, the board is
unlikely to be preempt managerial wrongs, particularly absent information
from outside auditors.88 This is, in part, since board is rarely involved in
the daily operational aspect of company management.89

(3) Minutes
The board of directors is the collegial organ of the company which
decisions are commonly made by a majority vote.90 The board meetings
themselves raise several good governance questions; for example, the
prior notice of board meetings, sans explicit prescript 
charter, can be made as late as two days prior notice, and there is no
statutory obligation that such notices specify the purpose of the meeting.91
However, good corporate governance would require for directors to be
          
specification of the meetings purpose (including the relevant
documentation) are advised.92       
deliver, prior to each meeting, the appropriate agenda which shall include
the information and materials that will be delivered to directors and the
matters that will be addressed and acted upon during the meeting.93

(4) Committees
While private companies are not legally required to form committees,
it has become a common practice for private companies, particularly those
who issue bonds, to establish various committees to which the board
delegate certain tasks.94 Audit committee is among the most ubiquitous
and important committees in private companies; It is in charge of
independent review of the financial records of the company, engagement
with the auditor

87

See Adams, supra note 76, at 64 (referencing Jay Lorsch, Pawns or Potentates: The
Reality of Americas Corporate Boards, Harv. Bus. School Press (1989)).
88
Id. at 65.
89
Brown & Casey, supra note 2, at 96.
90
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW AND ECONOMICS 213 (Foundation Press
2d. ed 2002).
91
Id. at 215.
92
Id. ( . . . although directors are free to contest.).
93
Stuart Gelfond, Robert Schwenkel & Hayley Cohen, Private Company Boards, 20
THE J. OF PRIVATE EQUITY SUMMER 2017 3 (2017).
94
Bainbridge supra note 90, at 215.
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In addition, the existence of an audit committee has an additional
significant in private companies since they are often less sophisticated than
public companies, have less organizational structure and understanding of
financials, and therefore an independent committee of experts can be a
                
controls and prevention of illicit actions by the management.95
In this regard, it is pertinent to reference the provisions of SOX that
                   
             
be composed of entirely independent directors and prohibits outside
auditors from concurrently consulting a company it audits.96

c.
Who Should Direct Company Corporate Governance 
Shareholder Primacy Vs. Board Primacy Vs. Management
Primacy?
For many years, the leading approach of company purpose was the
shareholder primacy, pursuant to which company must operate, was to
       97 The basis of this notion
relies on the fact that the providers of capital delegated their daily
management of the company to the management and the board which in
return must act as the shareholders fiduciaries.98
The shareholding model also enables a mechanism for overcoming the
agency problem it is associated with; Cadbury found that this model
support the adoption of a voluntary corporate governance code of ethics
and conduct, which lays out accountability and transparency principles,
intended to regulate management activity.99 This methodology manifest
the crux of my argument in this paper  that adoption of good corporate
governance principles, coupled with board supervision, are best to
overcome the misalignment of interest in startup companies between
shareholders, directors and managers-founders.100

95

Id. at 215.
Id. at 48-49.
97
Ntim, supra note 7, at 3.
98
Bainbridge supra note 90, at 48-49.
99
Ntim supra note 7, at 5 (referencing Cadbury, C., Report of the Committee on the
Financial
Aspects
of
Corporate
Governance
ICAEW
(1992)
https://www.icaew.com/technical/corporate-governance/codes-and-reports/cadburyreport).
100
Id. (noting that that imposition of obligations by the government or other supervisory
authorities would be counterproductive under an assumption of efficient factor markets as
well as the fact that it would limit the bargaining power of the actors in the investment
process).
96
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The notion of the shareholder primacy also derives the purpose and
role of the board of directors; Until recently, the pervasive view was that
the primary goal of the board of directors management of the company
was to achieve long-term shareholder value.101 However, this approach
                  !
announcement that it views the purpose of companies in a broader view as
      102 and thus reflects a
shift towards a stakeholder primacy, rather than maximize shareholder
profits.
Moreover, last year Senator Elizabeth Warren introduced the
Accountable Capitalism bill103 which shifts the fundamental notion of
        requiring that 40% of
directors in companies, grossing above $1 billion annually, be selected by
employees.104
The stakeholder model, in essence, is a notion that a company is not
just a for-         -     
accountability and responsibility towards various stakeholders, such as
employees, the government and local community, to name a few.105
In this respect, it was argued that a governance structure of a firm is
   !         
aimed at maximizing shareholders value instead of promoting the interests
of other existing and potential stakeholders of the company.106
This distinction is significant since it would affect the identity of the
appropriate organ to promote adequate corporate governance in the
c      !  
is often lacking comprehensive market viewpoint and focused narrowly
on the company and its success, the board of directors often includes
representatives of venture capital funds107, many of which are industry
experts, which can more effectively promote governance devices which

101

See Ntim supra note 7, at 7 (emphasizing that it is no longer sufficient for board!s to
merely oversee the financial results but rather take a more active role in the development
of ethical culture of the company).
102
Business Roundtable Redefines the Purpose of a Corporation to Promote An
Economy That Serves All Americans, BUS ROUNDTABLE (Aug. 19, 2019),
https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-redefines-the-purpose-of-acorporation-to-promote-an-economy-that-serves-all-americans.
103
S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2017).
104
Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance; Stakeholder Primacy; Federal Incorporation,
HARV. LAW (Aug. 17, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/17/corporategovernance-stakeholder-primacy-federal-incorporation/.
105
Ntim, supra note 7, at 2.
106
Id.
107
Fan, supra note 38, at 590.
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would also take into consideration cross-market entities, such as the
community, suppliers, and creditors.108
               ation is a
precursor of its obligation to promote corporate social responsibility. 109
This stance is a gapping bridge between the stakeholder primary approach
and the board primary approach. The latter, in a nutshell, is a view per
which shareholders ought to endow the board with sufficient power to
manage the company effectively, foregoing short-term value and decisionmaking.110           
lacking structural consensus, is that the board should be granted with
                         
  111 It is important to note, however, that the fundamental
      
        -making would be
less efficient, as they are lacking the requisite knowledge and
understanding of the firm to make an efficient determination vis-à-vis the
directors which are involved in the core operation of the company.112

4.

POSSIBLE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE SOLUTIONS TO
MARKET FAILURES

Board independence
Following the previous arguments supporting the increase of director
                    
                    
negative correlation between the success of the CEO and independence of
the board, meaning, the more successful the CEO the less independent the
board will be (since the monitoring will seem less optimal as the CEO is
doing a good job).113 This is, to some extent, a legal (market) failure, since
as a matter of law a conflict between the board and the management should

108

In this respect, White indicated that in light of the board of directors power to cast
company determinations through its board resolutions, as well as its composition, it should
be the organ accountable for balancing the various stakeholders in the Company. Allen L.
White, The Stakeholder Fiduciary: CSR, Governance and the Future of Boards, BUS. FOR
SOC. RESP. (Apr. 2006), https://www.bsr.org/reports/BSR_AW_Corporate-Boards.pdf.
109
Id. at 4.
110
Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and The Curious Turn
Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2071 (2010).
111
Id. at 2088-89.
112
Id. at 2089.
113
Adams, supra note 76, at 66.
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           114
However, this approach could be counterproductive, particularly in the
sphere of startups; reason being, as was found by Adams et. al, that an
increase in director independence leads to better CEO efficiency, shorter
CEO tenure and higher overall CEO compensation.115 Therefore, since
many startup directors are either representative of investors, possessing
substantial market and management knowledge, and are also functioning
as mentors to the founder-managers (and founder-CEO), they should be
granted with greater independence to prevent inexperienced foundermanagers from either looting the shareholders or making ill-advised
decisions.116
In this respect, it should be noted there are other factors that affect the
               
risk of replacement, a seemingly plausible assumption would be increased
supervision which will result is higher company performance. However,
since there is an underlying assumption that the board is at any given time
            
board composition would result, in theory, in reduction in optimal
supervision).117
While board independence in public companies is necessary (as to
ensure the management acts in the best interest of the public shareholders),
              
majority shareholders (whom are commonly also the management), as
otherwise they are viewed as ineffective118 mainly since in private
companies, more often than in public ones, directors operate as mentors to
the management, providing commercial knowledge to the management.119
Additionally, board independence is particularly salient in viewing
            
      he Board failed to prevent
        partnerships and failed to exert
sufficient oversight of such relationships.120
114

Brown & Casey, supra note 2, at 97.
Adams, supra note 76, at 70.
116
BRAD FELD & MAHENDRA RAMSINGHANI, STARTUP BOARDS: GETTING THE MOST OUT
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Gabrielsson, supra note 72, at 113.
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Munzing, supra note 12, at 6-7. Munzig further argues that these failures resulted from
insufficient communication and direction by the board of the government, whereas, as
argued throughout this paper, board mentoring of the management results in preferable
financial and operational results.
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Introduction of independent director

Independent directors are generally viewed as director who have no
ongoing (or prior) relationship with the corporation other than as a
director.121 The importance of the appointment of independent directors is
exemplified in several spheres: the first, Delaware court tend to condition
                  
transaction only when the board action has been taken by an independent
director.122 Moreover, as the appointment of independent directors became
a manifestation of good corporate governance123, neglecting to act
accordingly to can cause market distrust. In this respect, Broughman
analyzed the benefit of introduction of independent director in startup
companies.124 In startups, independent directors currently fill several
duties, inter alia, breaking deadlocks in the board and impartial oversight
on the management for the common stockholders (since other boards are
usually representing the founder-managers or the investors).125 An
additional benefit of including an independent director(s), which are often
             
interests of the various organs of the company in major company
events.126This might be particularly salient in such events where serious
  -              
majority stockholders.

5.

CONCLUSIONS

In this paper, I have analyzed the current corporate governance regime
that applies to private companies, with particular attention to the particular
characteristics of startups, vis-à-vis the growing research on the effect of
good governance in public companies for the past decades.
It has been found that implementation of good/recommended
     !     
121

Brown & Casey, supra note 2, at 108 (citing Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of
Independent Directors in the United State, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock
Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1968-83 (2007)); see generally Jeffrey N. Gordon,
The Rise of Independent Directors in the United State, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value
and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468-83 (2007).
122
Brown & Casey, supra note 2 at 106.
123
Id. (Explaining that Jeffery Gordon indicated that following the Enron financial
fiasco, federal legislation requires public companies to have audit committees comprised
of only independent directors).
124
Brian J. Broughman, The Role of Independent Directors in Startup Firms, 3 UTAH L.
REV. 461, 461 (2010).
125
Id. at 462.
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Id. at 465.
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transaction costs, improves corporate management (though still unsure if
affects company share price) and reduces the misalignment of interest
between the various corporate organs (founders-managers, directors, and
shareholders).
I have indicated several good-governance approaches that have been
found by various legal scholars and economists alike to be successful in
implementation in private companies, inter alia, introduction of
independent director, creation of audit committee, elaborated board
materials and longer notice period, alongside some more groundbreaking
suggestions such as a mandatory disclosure regime, that can affect the
inherent risk and uncertainty associated with startup venture financing.
While startups require flexibility in operation in order to successfully
implement their disruptive technology, as I have indicated in this paper,
the implementation of the aforementioned good governance
                
method, as was used by the OECD private company guidelines) could
have positive effects both on their management, financing ability and
future growth.



